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Abstract
In this proposed thesis, we present a bilevel optimization model for setting the electricity
prices according to Time-and-Level-of-Use (TLOU) policy. In TLOU, different price brackets are
used for different periods during the day according to the actual load consumed by the customers. In
our bilevel optimization model, we consider the retailer as the leader of the problem and customers
as the followers. The retailer aims at maximizing the profit, and the customers seek to minimize
their electricity costs. Using the bilevel optimization model, we compare the emissions model that
considers the weighted sum of profits and emissions as the objective function to the one that considers
only profits. In the bilevel models, the customers can either buy electricity from the retailer or from
the competitor who uses the Time-of-Use (TOU) policy. Then we reformulated the bilevel models
into a single-level problem using KKT conditions to generate the lower-level problem’s optimality.
Afterward, we apply a standard big-M method to linearize the non-linear constraints resulting from
the KKT complementary slackness conditions into a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
model. We solve this MILP using off-the-shelf solvers for an extensive set of instances using real-
world data from the IAC database.
Our computational results indicate that the inclusion of emissions into the objective im-
proves the retailer’s weighted profits by using emission-efficient fuels. The retailer uses dynamic
TLOU prices to reduce the demand peaks during on-peak hours. Additionally, customers also min-
imize their costs through demand shifts. Finally, we conclude that the retailer shall include the
emission into the price-setting objective function to improve the weighted profits. We validate our
results by conducting sensitivity to fuel supply, cost of emissions, and customers’ flexibility for
demand shift.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Electricity Use Outlook
The world has always been heavily dependent on different sources of energy. Total energy
consumption measured in terawatt-hours (TWh) has increased from 5.6 ∗ 103 TWh in 1800 to
157.0 ∗ 103 TWh for the year 2018, representing an increase of approximately 28 folds. As shown
in the Figure-1.1, taken from [Ritchie and Roser, 2020b], the significant increase is represented by
two fossil fuels, coal, and crude oil. The % share of coal has increased from 1.71% to 27.93%, and
crude oil increased from 0% to 34.52%. As of 2018, these two fuels contribute 62% to the total world
consumption, indicating the world’s energy consumption dependency shift towards fossil fuels. The
reason may be attributed to abundant supply and economically low cost compared to the other fuel
sources. According to [Ritchie and Roser, 2020c], as of 2018, the USA has the largest coal reserves
at nearly 240 billion tons, followed by Russia, China, Australia, and India, each having reserves
of more than 100 billion tons. Similarly, many countries have abundant reserves of oil and gas.
Venezuela has the largest oil reserves amounting to 47.95 billion barrels, and Iran has more than
1100 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves.
According to [Ritchie and Roser, 2020c], if the world continues to consume fossil fuels at
the current rate, then the fossil fuel reserves will only last for few more years. For example, coal
is expected to last for 114 years, natural gas for 52 years, oil for 50 years. Due to the concerns of
running out of fossil fuels, the world has shifted its preferences for energy consumption. After 1970,
the energy contribution of non-fossil fuels such as nuclear energy has increased from 0.12% to 1.72%.
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Figure 1.1: World energy consumption over the years
Electricity has always been a major form of energy consumption across the world. The per
capita electricity consumption across the world has increased from 1.2∗103 kWh in 1971 to 3.1∗103
kWh in 2014 i.e. approximately 2.5 times increase [IBRD, ]. The US has per capita electricity
consumption equal to 12 ∗ 103 kWh [Ritchie and Roser, 2020b]. The electricity is produced from
different fuel sources. Fossil fuels, mainly coal, have always been the major source of electricity
production. Figure-1.2 shows the contribution of different fuels in electricity generation over the
years. Coal constantly contributed 40% to electricity generation however contribution of oil has
decreased. Recently, focus has shifted to more environment-friendly fuel sources. Like % share
of natural gas increased from 12.33% to 21.92% and that of nuclear has increased from 2.38%
to 10.38%. According to the U.S. Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the residential sector
contributes to 37%, the commercial sector contributes 35%, and the industrial sector contributes
27% of the total electricity use in the USA. The transportation industry uses only 1% of the electricity
however this share can increase substantially with the advent of electric vehicles. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2019 gas was the largest source of electricity
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generation contributing 38%, and coal was the second largest source contributing 23% of the total
electricity. Nuclear energy contributed nearly 20% [EIA, ].
Figure 1.2: World electricity production by source
1.2 Emissions Outlook
Emissions due to the use of different fuel sources have always been on the rise. According
to [Ritchie and Roser, 2020a] the global CO2 concentration has increased from 282 parts per million
(ppm) to 406 ppm over the years from 1800 through 2017. This increase has mostly been attributed
to increased human activities such as the use of fossil fuels etc. Coal has always been the major
contributor to the world’s emissions. In 1800, it was responsible for 100% of the CO2 emission, and
in 2017, it contributes 40.31%. The second major contributor is oil, sharing 34.96% of the emissions.
Gas corresponds to approximately 20% of the emissions. In 2017, the world’s per capita emissions
were 4.78 tonnes per year which in 1800 were nearly 0.03 tonnes.
Figure-1.3 shows the share of different sectors in the emissions. Electricity and heat pro-
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duction have always been the principal sector to produce emissions. Its share has been increased
from 28.56% to 49% in 2014. This is evident from the fact that the per capita electricity demand
has increased by approximately 2.5 folds during this time. The second major contributor is the
transportation sector which corresponds nearly 20% of the emissions. In the US, according to the
EPA, top sources for emissions are transportation (29%) and electricity production (28%) [EPA, ].
In the US, coal contributes 65% of emissions due to electricity generation, natural gas 33%, and
petroleum contributes 1% of the emissions due to electricity generation.
Figure 1.3: CO2 emissions by sector
1.3 Problem Motivation
Electricity utility companies face varying demand throughout the day usually known as
on-peak demand and off-peak demand. During on-peak demand, the electricity is generated at the
plant’s full capacity, and off-peak leads to electricity generation at lower capacities. Meeting the
demand for electricity on a real-time basis becomes a challenge as changing the electricity generation
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according to abrupt demand variation may or may not possible. Therefore, the utility companies use
the Demand Response (DR) tool to meet the customers’ demands on a real-time basis. According to
[Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008], DR can be defined as ”changes in electricity consumption by the end
consumer in response to the changing prices of electricity over time. To induce the lower demands
during on-peak demand or to maintain the system reliability, DR provides incentives to customers
to shift demand to off-peak hours”. DR program employs either incentive-based program (IBP) or
price-based program (PBP). Figure-1.4 taken from [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008] summarises both
the programs. In the classical IBP, the participating customers receive either a bill credit or discount
rate. In the market based IBP, the participating customers are rewarded with money proportionate
to an individual’s performance and contribution to load reduction during peak hours. PBP programs
use the dynamic pricing policies in which electricity rates vary according to electricity consumption.
The PBP’s objective is to flatten the demand variation by using higher prices during on-peak hours
and lower prices during off-peak hours [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008]. The basic type of PBP is
Time-of-Use (TOU) rates. TOU offers different rates for different times of the day.
Figure 1.4: Demand response programs
The TOU electricity tariffs are based on consumed electricity over time and take into account
that each hour has a corresponding price per unit of electricity consumed [Zhang et al., 2014]. The
pricing difference during the off-peak and on-peak hours accounts for the fact that certain utility
companies have to use multiple fuels to generate electricity. To meet the increased demand during the
on-peak hours, some utility companies use secondary fuel such as gas along with primary fuel, coal
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[Zhang et al., 2014]. This leads to an increase in costs since the secondary fuel sources often costlier
than primary fuel sources. The industries try to switch their higher energy consumption activities
to the off-peak hours to save on consumption costs. Shifting hourly consumption to low prices does
not change total daily consumption. However, this has an impact on increased CO2 emissions as
during on-peak hours, the same consumption would have been satisfied using gas and coal. Since
coal produces more emissions than gas, shifting to off-peak hours would mean more emissions for
the same daily consumption. According to [McIntyre et al., 2011], unit emissions per gigawatt-hours
(GWh) are 21% and 77% higher for coal compared to oil and natural gas, respectively. Thus, shifting
electricity consumption from on-peak hours to off-peak hours can reduce the total electricity cost
of manufacturing companies with a trade-off of an increased carbon footprint. The power sector
alone contributes 42.5% of the total emissions [Li et al., 2018] and manufacturing sector over 38%
emissions [May et al., 2015].
Further, to reduce the energy consumption and costs of the industries across the US, the
Department of Energy (DOE) has established the Industrial Assessment Centre (IAC) [Data, ]. The
IAC conducts a no-cost energy assessment of small and medium-sized industries. IAC has maintained
the 40 years’ data collected from the assessments on its website and is available to the public domain
[Data and IAC, ]. Figure-1.5 is prepared using the IAC database. It clearly illustrates that 61% of
the energy cost in industries corresponds to the electricity and thereby a major contribution to
carbon emissions. Efforts can be made at both electricity generation and consumption sides to
optimize the cost of electricity generation and consumption using available DR tools.
Figure 1.5: Industrial energy consumption cost distribution across the USA
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In this context, we are studying a problem of electricity price setting by the utility com-
pany according to demand and time of the day considering the impacts of different emission lev-
els for various fuel sources. In this problem, we are viewing an extended version of TOU known
as Time-and-Level-of-Use (TLOU). TLOU is a recently introduced terminology in the literature
[Gomez-Herrera and Anjos, 2018, Duarte et al., 2020]. TLOU considers the time and level of en-
ergy consumed in each of the time frames. In TLOU, for any given hour, if the energy consumed is
less than the specified limit, then lower prices will be applicable; otherwise, higher prices will kick in.
However, in TOU for any given time hour, a single rate is used based on on-peak hour and off-peak
hour. We have explained the TOU vs. TLOU difference in the hypothetical Figure-1.6. The blue
dotted line shows the constant TOU price at any hour of the day. However, the TLOU has different
prices at any given hour. If the customer uses the energy lower than the limit set up by the utility
company, then price corresponding to the orange line (TLOU- Lower Price) is applicable. However,
if the customer uses more energy than the utility company’s limit, then differential consumption is
charged according to the grey line (TLOU- Higher Price).
Figure 1.6: TOU vs TLOU pricing structure
We propose an optimization model based on sequential decision making to set electricity
prices following the TLOU policy. Here the utility company, which acts as the leader, first makes
the decision related to price-setting using the TLOU method. Then based on the prices set up
by the leader, the customers, who act as followers, try to minimize their electricity consumption
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costs. The customers do so by shifting the consumption throughout the day according to their shift
capacities. Followers have the option to buy electricity from the leader’s competitor as well. The
competitor acts as the boundary for the leader to set the prices. As if the leader sets up exorbitantly
higher rates than the competitor, then followers will switch to competitors, thus cutting off the
leader’s potential profits. This sequential decision making is known as Stackelberg Game Theory
[von Stackelberg, 1954, Colson et al., 2007]. To meet the demand, the leader generates electricity
using different fuel sources such as coal, oil, and gas, which have different cost and emission levels.
The leader’s profits are evaluated by considering the impacts of carbon emissions. We also analyze
how the prices, profits, electricity generation, and customers’ electricity demand behavior vary if
the leader wants to minimize the emissions. When carbon emissions are considered, the leader’s
objective will become multi-objective as emissions produced are in tons, and profits are $ value.
Thereby, to make it a single objective, we will impose a penalty on emissions, which will lower
the customer’s profits. Thus we will be comparing the results of two optimization problems, one
with carbon emissions and one without considering the penalty of carbon emissions. Our aim of the
study is to ascertain how carbon emissions impact the price settings, profits, customers’ demand shift
behavior. Another goal to analyze how the emission produced is changed as the penalty on carbon
emissions is varied. Our proposed model will intend to provide a mathematical framework tool to
the utility companies to assess the price changes and shift in customers’ consumption behavior if
the companies consider the price-setting model as one of the tools to cut down the emissions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Energy Consumption and Emission Relationship
The authors in [Siler-Evans et al., 2012] studied the Marginal Emission Factors (MEFs)
for North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). In this paper, the author quantified
marginal impacts on carbon emissions due to the change in electricity demands. The MEF is briefly
defined as the incremental change in carbon emissions as a result of the change in demand and thus
is a critical way to assess the cost benefits of using different fuels in DR [Zheng et al., 2015]. The
authors in paper [Siler-Evans et al., 2012] studied the impacts of marginal fuel sources used to meet
demand at a different time of the day and change in marginal emission levels during that time.
Figure-2.1 taken from [Siler-Evans et al., 2012] shows the various fuel sources used during low and
high demand periods for the Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) region. The horizontal axis
shows the change in total electricity generation per hour (MWh/h), and the vertical axis shows the
difference in electricity generated by different fuel sources per hour (MWh/h). The β represents
the contribution of the respective fuel source in electricity generation. It can be seen that during
a low demand period, coal is the dominant marginal fuel source; however, during a high demand
period, gas is the primary marginal fuel source. The study concluded that a change in emissions
due to varying demand depends on the type of fuel being used to meet the demand. The coal-fired
power plants emit more emissions, thereby displacing demand in coal-heavy regions will yield more
emission savings. For example, avoiding one megawatt-hour of electricity MRO region will avoid
roughly 70% CO2 emissions compared to the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)
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region. This is due to the fact that during a high demand period, gas is the dominant source
of electricity generation, which has low carbon emissions compared to coal [McIntyre et al., 2011,
Siler-Evans et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 2014].
Figure 2.1: Variation in fuels used to meet the total demand during low and high demand period
It is also essential to know the behavioral relationship between electricity consumption,
electricity prices, and the associated emissions for any numerical analysis. In [Lee and Chong, 2016],
the authors have studied the causal relationship between energy consumption, energy prices, and
carbon emissions using the Granger Causality Analysis. They analyzed emissions data ranging
from 1973-2012 in different sectors such as commercial and residential buildings using different
fuel sources. The authors have drawn many conclusions from the study. The most significant
is the commercial building sector reduces the consumption if electricity prices increase. Also, the
emissions are increased with the increase in electricity consumption. The carbon-neutral fuel sources
such as renewable or natural gas make the electricity generation more efficient in terms of carbon
emissions. In this work, the authors studied the pairwise relation between consumption, cost, and
emissions. They used the descriptive analysis to define the causal relationship; however, they did
not perform any prescriptive analysis to quantify the impacts of one component on the other two
elements together.
The utility companies face varying demand throughout the day and use the DR tool to
balance the varying supply-demand relation. The ultimate goal of using the DR tools is to flatten
the demand curve by using higher prices during the high demand period and low prices during
the low demand period [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008]. However, as shown in fig 2.1, lowering the
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demand implies using more coal, thus potentially increasing emissions. The DR tools are beneficial
for both customers and utility companies. The customers can save on their total electricity bill
costs [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008]. To meet the flexible demand, the utility companies have to
be flexible in terms of generation capacity, transmission and distribution capacities, fuel resource
allocations, ramping capabilities [ram, , Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008]. These all are infrastructure
intensive, and a stable demand curve can help the companies utilize the infrastructure in optimum
way [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008]. In [Braithwait et al., 2002], the authors concluded a 50% re-
duction in prices could have been attained by just a 5% reduction in electricity demand during the
2000-2001 California electricity crisis.
From the above discussion, we can say it is worth studying the combined relation of elec-
tricity consumption, prices, and associated emissions. The authors of [Lee and Chong, 2016] have
established a pairwise causal relationship using descriptive analysis. Similarly, the authors in
[Siler-Evans et al., 2012] have quantified the marginal impacts on emission with varying demand
throughout the day. Since the energy producer has the ability to make a decision about types of fuel
used, level of energy generation, we are proposing an optimization model combining all three aspects,
consumption-price-emissions, together. In the following section, we present relevant optimization
modeling methodology used in this kind of problem.
2.2 Modeling Methodology
PBP is a dynamic price setting tool [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008] where prices are set
according to consumption by the customers or the total demand at the utility companies. Thus
it is a hierarchical relationship between utility companies and the customers. It is similar to the
’Toll Price Setting Problem (TPSP)’ discussed in [Colson et al., 2005]. In the TPSP, the authorities
want to set up the tolls on the specified set of road networks, maximizing the toll collections. The
users using the system wish to minimize the cost of using the network. This is a hierarchical
relationship. The authorities set the toll anticipating the flow in the network, and users make the
decisions about network utilization based on the setup prices to minimize their costs. The authors
in [Colson et al., 2005] as has stated many such examples where similar situations are applicable
in real life. Setting up electricity prices is one of those real life examples. The leader (retailer,
supplier, producer) wants to set up the prices or incentives based on known or anticipated demand.
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The followers (customers) make the decision about electricity consumption according to set prices
by the leader. If the leader sets the prices too high, the followers may shift to the competitors
offering lower prices, and if prices are low, the leader may miss out on potential profits. This type
of hierarchical problem is a classical problem that has been studied in many papers briefly discussed
in [Dempe, 2018]. In further discussion, we outline similar works related to energy sectors. We have
summarized all those papers in Table-2.1.
The authors of [Zhang et al., 2014] considered the energy-conscious job shop scheduling
problem (JSP) to minimize electricity consumption. The authors studied the impacts of JSP on elec-
tricity costs and emissions due to TOU tariffs. They formulated the time-indexed, multi-objective,
mixed integer programming (MIP) model to minimize both emissions and electricity costs. The
authors used the exact approach to solve the MIP. The authors concluded that while shifting job
scheduling from on-peak hours to mid or off-peak hours, it will reduce the energy cost by 6.9%;
however, it may increase the CO2 emissions.
Similarly, the authors of [Shrouf et al., 2014] considered the single machine job scheduling to
minimize the electricity consumption costs. The authors employed an integer programming model to
reduce the energy costs by considering the launch time, idle time, and turn off times of the machine
during a production shift. The authors employed a heuristic approach to solve the mathematical
model. The authors suggested shifting machining operations in the low-cost period. However, this
may impact the emission levels. Both the papers accounted for only consumption optimization, and
in-directly minimizes the emissions. Since emissions depend on electricity production and overall
demand faced by the producer, so optimization at a single consumer may not be an optimistic
approach for the hierarchical decision making.
The authors in [Afşar et al., 2016] considered the bilevel approach to optimize the sequential
decision making. The leader, the energy supplier, wishes to set the prices that minimize the demand
peak faced by the supplier. The supplier uses the day-ahead (DA) real-time pricing to define the
prices. In this work, the authors considered the constant or known demand and constant DA prices.
The authors of [Zugno et al., 2013] considered the stochastic nature of the DA market and demand
faced by the leader. In this work, the authors optimized the expected profits of the leaders and
customers under different scenarios. In both the papers, the authors concluded that dynamic price
structure as compared to the fixed pricing structure is the most effective way to reduce the demand
peaks faced by the leader. These papers considered the DA pricing structure based on spot prices.
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They did not account for time and level of use in their price settings i.e.; they have only one price
at any given hour of the day.
IBP based bilevel optimization has been considered in [Salah et al., 2018]. In this, the
demand aggregator designs the DR portfolio of the customers by the active participation of the
customers. To encourage participation, the aggregator offers them a premium and reduces the
demand peaks. The authors used the satisficing theory to model the bilevel optimization. The
incentives are provided to increase the aspiration of customers. The incentives increase as more and
more customers participates in the DR portfolio. This shows that IBP is one way to reduce the
demand peaks by offering incentives at fixed prices of electricity. However, as noted in [Qdr, 2006],
the IBP program represents the contractual arrangements designed by the provider to elicit demand
reductions. In the PBP, the customer can have the option to buy electricity from any of the
providers. TOU based trilevel optimization problem has been studied in [Aussel et al., 2020]. The
trilevel model included the energy supplier, aggregator, and end-users. The end-users optimization
problem has been included in the aggregator’s problem by an explicit formula, thus making the
overall optimization problem as bilevel.
The TLOU is a newly introduced DR tool that accounts for load alongside the time while
setting the electricity prices. To our knowledge, only a few papers have presented a TLOU based
optimization problem. The paper [Anjosa et al., ] considers the problem of price-setting by an
electricity retailer to the smart home consumers using the TLOU DR program. In this paper, the
authors consider electricity retailer as the leader who buys electricity from the utility company
through a bilateral contract. The smart home consumers are considered as followers. The leader’s
problem maximizes the profits of the retailer, anticipating the reaction of the followers. The follower’s
problem considers the minimization of the electricity consumption costs by shifting loads according
to the TLOU set by the retailers. The followers are given the option to buy electricity from the
retailer’s competitor, which offers flat prices. This restricts the prices set by the retailer to the
boundary of competitor’ prices. The authors solved the mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
reformulation of bilevel optimization. The authors concluded that this pricing structure helps the
retailer to improve the profits, and profits are more if the customers are more willing to shift loads as
TLOU helps in generating homogeneous consumption profiles. Our proposed work is an extension
of this work.
None of the bilevel optimization problems has considered the impacts of emissions on price
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setting. The paper [Wei et al., 2014] considers the price-setting under the government’s optimal
emission taxing policies. The paper presents a bilevel mathematical model to set the government’s
optimal taxing strategies on the carbon emission and optimizing the profits of the utility company.
The leader’s objective is to set the optimum tax rates based on the levels of carbon emissions and
set the limits on the utility company’s emissions. The major advantage of this model is setting up
the individual tax rate for each utility company based on respective performance and minimizing
the production cost of each utility company individually. This model is economically efficient as in
the single tax rate. The utility company does not have flexibility according to their size production
quantities. They must pay the same tax rate even if they belong to different emission limits. The
lower level problem considers the electricity production problem of the utility company. To meet the
demand, the utility company has demand constraints, the constraint on emissions generated. The
utility company’s objective is to minimize the production costs, given the fixed tax rate (decision of
upper-level problem). Thus, the lower-level problem’s objective is to minimize the inclusive cost of
emission tax and the cost of meeting the demand.
We are proposing a bilevel optimization model that considers the impacts of carbon emission
in price-setting while maximizing the utility company’s profits and minimizing the costs of industrial
customers. Our model is inspired by [Anjosa et al., ]. Our proposed framework is different from
[Anjosa et al., ] in two ways. First, we are accounting the carbon emissions into the objective of
the leader’s problem. The leader has an option to use various fuels having different emission levels
and costs. Second, [Anjosa et al., ] considered a lower limit up to which low price will be applicable
as a parameter to the leader’s problem. This may not be an optimistic approach to fix the lower
limit. The authors stated that using this as a variable will make the problem non-linear, which is
harder to solve. In our proposed framework, we consider this limit setting as a variable and present
a methodology to solve the non-linear model as a linear optimization problem. The detailed problem
statement is presented in the next chapter.
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Authors Modeling
Levels
Upper Level
Leader & Obj
Lower Level
Followers & Obj
Sector DR Tool
[Zhang et al., 2014,
Shrouf et al., 2014]
Single Manufacturer-JSP
Minimize Elec Cost and Emis-
sions
- Manufacturing TOU
[Afşar et al., 2016] Bilevel Energy Provider
Set prices maximizing revenues
Residential Customers
Minimize Consumption & Incon-
venience Cost
Electricity DA Real
Time Pric-
ing
[Zugno et al., 2013] Bilevel Energy retailer
Maximize Profits operating un-
der Regulated Prices
Consumers
Minimize Consumption & Incon-
venience Cost
Electricity Regulated
& Spot
Price Pro-
curement
[Salah et al., 2018] Bilevel DR Aggregator
Set incentive prices while maxi-
mizing profits
Consumers
Minimize consumption cost con-
sidering incentives
Electricity IBP
[Aussel et al., 2020] Trilevel Energy Suppliers
Set prices maximizing profits
Aggregators and End Users1
Maximize profits of aggregators
Electricity TOU
[Anjosa et al., ] Bilevel Energy retailer
Set prices maximizing profits
Different segment of Customer
Minimize Consumption & Incon-
venience Cost
Electricity TLOU
[Wei et al., 2014] Bilevel Government Agency
Set tax rates limiting carbon
emissions
Grid Operators
Minimize production cost at set
tax rates
Energy Sectors -
Our Proposed Work Bilevel Electricity Producer
Set prices maximizing profits &
minimize emissions
Industrial Customers
Minimize Consumption & Incon-
venience Cost
Electricity TLOU
1 End user models are replaced with an explicit formula. Resulting model is a Bilevel optimization problem.
Table 2.1: Summary of studies on electricity price, consumption, and emissions
2.3 Review of Bilevel Optimization
There has been substantial literature available on bilevel optimization. The papers [Dempe, 2018,
Colson et al., 2007] have compiled the reviews, literature, or any other work available on the bilevel
optimization. We first present a general formulation of bilevel optimization and then discuss how to
linearize the formulation to MIP.
Minx∈X,y F (x, y) (2.1a)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0 (2.1b)
Miny f(x, y) (2.1c)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0 (2.1d)
The variables are divided into two classes namely upper-level variables, x ∈ Rn1 , and the
lower-level variables, y ∈ Rn2 . The objective functions are also divided into two classes, F : Rn1 ×
Rn2 −→ R as the upper level objective function and f : Rn1 × Rn2 −→ R as the lower level objective
function. Similarly the constraints G : Rn1×Rn2 −→ Rm and g : Rn1×Rn2 −→ Rm are the upper level
and lower level constraints respectively. Upper-level constraints involve variables from both levels.
This type of problems is often categorized as Stackelberg Game Models [von Stackelberg, 1954,
Dempe, 2018, Colson et al., 2007]. In this model the leader is assumed to anticipate the reactions
of the followers and then his best (optimal) strategy i.e., the leader chooses the optimal strategy x
in a set X ⊆ Rn and the each of the followers has the strategy set Y (x) ⊆ Rn corresponding to each
x ∈ X. Bilevel optimization problem is solved either optimistically or pessimistically [Dempe, 2018].
There may be cases where the follower’s problem may have multiple optimal solutions for the given
leader’s decision . In such case, the leader may choose the optimal solution optimizing an upper-level
objective function,F (x, y). This is called as the optimistic or weak form of a bilevel optimization
problem. The reverse is the case in the pessimistic approach. Most of the literature has investigated
the optimistic approach [Dempe, 2018]. In practical cases, it is rather rare that lower-level problems
will have multiple solutions for the given leader’s problem.
The bilevel optimization problems are non-convex and non-differentiable optimizations prob-
lems. However, if for all x ∈ X, the followers’ problem becomes a convex problem, then we can
transform the bilevel optimization problem to MILP by replacing the followers’ problem with Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) [Colson et al., 2007]. The KKT conditions included the primal and dual fea-
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sibility constraints for the lower level problem, complementary slackness conditions for the primal
follower’s problem. Adding KKT conditions to the upper-level problem will give the MILP formu-
lation of the bilevel optimization. MILP can be solved easily through off-shelf available solvers.
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Chapter 3
Problem Statement and
Formulation
3.1 Problem Statement
In this work, we present a bilevel optimization problem for electricity price-setting consid-
ering the impacts of emissions due to electricity generation. The leader is the electricity producer;
let’s call it a retailer for simplicity. The retailer produces electricity using a thermal power plant
where different fuel sources are used. The retailer sells the electricity to the K industrial customers.
The customers act as the followers of the bilevel problem. Through this model, the retailer wants
to gauge the impacts on electricity prices, profits, cost of emissions, and customers’ behavior as the
emissions are included in the retailer’s profit function. We assume that the retailer uses the TLOU
tool for demand management for each hour t of the day.
We assume the retailer operates in a competitive market where the competitor sells the
electricity at tariffs γt (¢/kWh). We assume that the competitor uses the TOU price structure and
offers flat prices after accounting for all demand variations and electricity production costs. Further,
we assume that the customers do not have any prior contracts signed up with either the retailer or
the competitor. This means the customer has the choice to buy any amount of electricity from the
retailer or competitor during any hour of the day. This assumption was made to make the model
more flexible and not imposing any restrictions on the customers. Though the retailer can limit the
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electricity purchased by the customer from the competitor; however, then the retailer either needs
to offer competitive prices or give some incentives to the customer. To make the model flexible,
we are not imposing any restrictions on electricity purchased and let the model decide the optimal
solution.
The retailer is assumed to know the current daily demand Dk and also hourly current
demand profile dkt of each customer. In the TLOU, the retailer sets up a lower limit, Ψ, on hourly
electricity consumption by the customer. Then the retailer sets up the lower unit price Π`t and the
higher unit price Πht corresponding to Ψ. The customers satisfy their demand by a combination of
W `kt, W
h
kt, or Ukt. The W
`
kt represents the electricity bought from the retailer at Π
`
t , W
h
kt electricity
bought from retailer at Πht , and Ukt electricity bought from the competitor at γt. We also impose a
limit, m on maximum price difference between two time periods. For example maximum difference
between Π`t at time t and Π
`
t+1 at time t+1 cannot exceed m. Same for Π
h
t . This limit is for
the ease of the customers. Each of the customer has some flexibility to shift some of the demand
at each of the hour to some later or prior hour of the day. This is because of the fact suppose
customer k has a maximum hourly demand of 100 (kWh) and at 16:00 hours it has a demand of
60 (kWh), so the customer can shift 40 (kWh) from some other to make 16:00 hours consumption
to 100 (kWh) or can make to 0 (kWh). This shifting capacity of each customer is represented by
ωkt. The hourly electricity shifting decisions are represented by V
+
kt for upward shifting and V
−
kt
for downward shifting from the current demand. Since the shifting of demand from the current
demand, the customer may face some inconvenience. Therefore an equivalent inconvenience unit
cost ξkt (¢/kWh) for each customer has been considered. The ξkt is proportional to the ωkt. The
Figure-3.1 represents the demand profile and shifting capacities of a customer at given Ψ.
Figure 3.1: Demand profile and shifting capacity at given Ψ
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The production of electricity involves various costs like operational costs, fuel costs, trans-
mission, and distribution costs. All these costs can be either be variable or can be considered as
parametric costs. Since our aim is to gauge the impacts of carbon emission only, we assume the
cost of production as variable cost and other costs as fixed. Considering other costs as the variable
will make the problem complex, which we leave for future works. Yst is the amount of fuels used to
produce the electricity Xt during time t. cs (¢/unit fuel) is cost of using fuel s. A unit of fuel used
produces αs (kWh/unit fuel) electricity and βs (lbs/unit fuel) emissions.
All of the fuel sources have different fuel efficiencies, i.e. (lbs/¢/kWh). There is a trade-off
between cost and emission generation, like coal is the cheapest among these fuel sources; however,
it has the highest CO2 emissions. Therefore the utility company will have a contradicting objective
to maximize profits and lower emissions. Thus we are formulating the leader’s problem as multi-
objective to maximize the profits under the TLOU price structure and minimize the emissions due
to electricity generation. Figure-3.2 represents the overall bilevel optimization problem for our
framework.
Figure 3.2: Bilevel problem description of leader and follower
The decisions made by the leader will affect the objective of the follower i.e. follower’s
objective will be a function of f(Π∗,Ψ∗) where Π∗ = {Π`t ,Πht } and Ψ∗ = {Ψ} denotes the optimal
decisions of the leader’s problem. The followers act according to prices Π`t and Π
h
t set by the leader.
Therefore, the energy consumed at both higher and lower prices will be a function of the prices set
by the leader. We denote the optimal decision of the follower as W ∗,`kt (Π,Ψ) and W
∗,h
kt (Π,Ψ). The
objective of the followers is to reduce electricity consumption costs while meeting their individual
demands. For this, they have the option to either buy electricity from the utility company at the
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TLOU defined prices or can buy the electricity from the competitor at flat rates γt. The competitor
plays an important role in this setting. This gives an option to customers to choose from low cost
energy, and this will also act as the boundary for the leader to set prices and maximize the profits
around this boundary. In the next section, we present our mathematical optimization model for this
framework.
3.2 Model Formulation
Following is the detailed description of the notations we are using to formulate the mathe-
matical optimization model. Then in the sub-section (3.2.1), we first describe the followers’ problem,
and then in the sub-section (3.2.2), we describe the leader’s problem. Section (3.3) describes the
MILP formulation of bilevel optimization.
Sets:
K Set of different customers, indexed on k
T Set of time periods (hr) of a day, indexed on t
S Set of different types of fuel sources available, indexed on s
Parameters:
cs Unit cost (¢/unit fuel) of fuel s used
N Maximum number of price changes allowed
ξkt Inconvenience cost (¢/kWh) of the customer k for shifting from current demand
Dk Daily current demand (kWh/day) of electricity from the customer k
dkt Current demand profile (kWh/hour) of customer k during time t
ωkt Maximum demand shifting capacity of customer k during time t
αs Unit electricity (kWh/unit fuel) generated per fuel source s
βs Unit CO2 emissions (lbs/fuel source) produced by fuel source s
m Maximum price difference allowed between two price brackets i.e. Π`t/Π
h
t at t and t+1
γt Unit prices (¢/kWh) offered by the competitor.
Leader’s problem decision variable:
Π`t Lower unit price (¢/kWh) set in time t
Πht Higher unit price (¢/kWh) set in time t
Xt Amount of electricity (kWh/hour) generated in time t
Yst Amount of fuel s used in time t
Pt Binary variable, 1 if there is a price change between periods t and t+1 and 0 otherwise
Ψ Limit set up by the retailer upto which lower prices will be applicable
Follower’s problem decision variable:
W `kt Energy consumption at lower price in time t (kWh) by customer k
Whkt Energy consumption at higher price in time t (kWh) by customer k
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V +kt Demand shifted (kWh/hour) upwards from the current demand profile by customer k in time t
V −kt Demand shifted (kWh/hour) downwards from the current demand profile by customer k in time t
Ukt Electricity (kWh/hour) bought from retailer’s competitor in time t by customer k
3.2.1 Follower’s Problem ∀k ∈ K
Min f(Π∗,Ψ∗) =
∑
t∈T
[
Π`t ×W `kt + Πht ×Whkt + γt × Ukt
]
+
∑
t∈T
ξkt × V +kt (3.1a)
Subject to:
W `kt +W
h
kt + V
−
kt + Ukt = V
+
kt + dkt ∀t ∈ T (3.1b)
∑
t∈T
[
W `kt +W
h
kt + Ukt
]
= Dk (3.1c)
W `kt ≤ Ψ ∀t ∈ T (3.1d)
V +kt ≤ ωkt ∀t ∈ T (3.1e)
W `kt,W
h
kt, V
+
kt , V
−
kt , Ukt ≥ 0 ∀t (3.1f)
3.2.1.1 Follower’s Model Explanation
(3.1a) represents the objective of the follower’s problem. The first part corresponds the
total cost of electricity consumed both at lower and higher prices and electricity consumed from
the competitor. The second part captures the equivalent cost of inconvenience for shifting from
current demand. Constraint (3.1b) represents the hourly upward or downward demand shift from
the current demand. For example for t = 1, if the total electricity consumed by the customer k is
less than the required i.e. W `k1 + W
h
k1 + Uk1 < dk1 then it will imply that V
+
k1 = 0 and V
−
k1 > 0.
Since the total demand of the demand is constant, so the customer has to consume it at some other
time frame suppose for t = 4, then the total electricity consumed will be W `k4 + W
h
k4 + Uk4 > dk1
therefore, V +k4 > 0 and V
−
k4 = 0. Constraint (3.1c) ensures that daily demand of the customer shall
be met. Constraint (3.1d) ensures that the electricity consumed at lower price shall not exceed the
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set capacity by the utility company. Constraint (3.1e) represents the maximum shifting capacity of
the customer to the higher energy price. Constraint (3.1f) represents the non-negativity constraint
for the variables.
The the optimal solution to the follower’s problem i.e. W ∗,`kt and W
∗,h
kt will be used in
calculating the objective values of the leader’s problem.
3.2.2 Leader’s Problem
Max
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
[
Π`t ×W
∗,`
kt (Π,Ψ) + Π
h
t ×W
∗,h
kt (Π,Ψ)
]
−
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
cs × Yst (3.2a)
Min
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
βs × Yst (3.2b)
Subject to:
∑
k∈K
[
W ∗,`kt (Π,Ψ) +W
∗,h
kt (Π,Ψ)
]
= Xt ∀t ∈ T (3.2c)
∑
s∈S
αs × Yst = Xt ∀t ∈ T (3.2d)
∣∣Π`t −Π`t+1∣∣ ≤ m× Pt ∀t ∈ T 3 t < |T | (3.2e)
∣∣Πht −Πht+1∣∣ ≤ m× Pt ∀t ∈ T 3 t < |T | (3.2f)
∑
t∈T
Pt ≤ N (3.2g)
Π`t ≤ Πht ∀t ∈ T (3.2h)
Π`t ,Π
h
t , Xt, Yst ≥ 0 ∀t, s (3.2i)
Pt ∈ {0, 1} ∀t (3.2j)
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3.2.2.1 Leader’s Model Explanation
(3.2a) represents the profit maximization objective of the utility company. The first part
represents the revenue earned by the company at the set prices. The second part represents the
cost of fuel sources used. (3.2b) corresponds to the emission minimization objective of the leader’s
problem. Constraint (3.2c) refers to the total electricity consumed at both higher and lower prices
by the customer, which is equal to the total electricity generated for each hour. Constraint (3.2d)
represents the total electricity generated at any given hour using different fuel sources. Constraints
(3.2e) to (3.2g) represents the TLOU price-setting constraints. (3.2e) the maximum lower energy
price change between two successive time periods. Here m is big enough number to capture the price
change, and if there is a price change between time periods, then Pt will take a value of 1. Similarly,
(3.2f) represents the constraint for higher energy prices. Constraint (3.2g) ensures the maximum
number of price changes permitted at the electricity prices. This is added to make the TLOU user
friendly and not allowing too many price changes in a given day. Constraint (3.2h) ensures the lower
energy consumption prices shall not exceed the higher energy prices. Constraints (3.2i) and (3.2j)
represents the non-negativity and binary variables constraint respectively.
3.3 Reformulation to Mixed Integer Linear Programming
The proposed model is a bilevel optimization model that is hard to solve [Colson et al., 2007,
Dempe, 2018]. For the given leader’s decisions i.e. Π∗ = {Π`t ,Πht } and Ψ∗ = {Ψ} the follower’s
problem is a linear programming. Therefore we can use the KKT conditions for the follower’s
problem and can reformulate the bilevel optimization as the MILP problem, which can be solved
easily using the available off-the-shelf solvers such as Gurobi or CPLEX.
The KKT conditions include (a) the primal and dual feasibility constraints (b) comple-
mentary slackness constraints. Therefore we have to introduce the dual variables for the followers’
problem. Continuous variables µakt, µ
b
k, µ
c
kt, µ
d
kt represent the dual variables for constraints (3.1b),
(3.1c), (3.1d), (3.1e) respectively. Constraints from (3.1b) to (3.1f) ensures the primal feasibility. Fol-
lowing constraints from (3.3a) to (3.3f) ensures the dual feasibility constraint. Since the constraints
(3.1b) and (3.1c) are the equality constraints, therefore from duality theory the dual variables µakt, µ
b
k
will be unrestricted dual variables respectively. The square brackets in each constraint represent the
primal variable for which the corresponding dual constraint has been written.
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Further it shall also be noted that µckt and µ
d
kt represent dual variables for constraints (3.1d)
and (3.1e) and according to duality theory for a minimization problem µckt, µ
d
kt ≤ 0. To make the
variables consistent i.e. non-negative variables, we are replacing those variables as −µckt,−µdkt ≥ 0
wherever they appear.
µakt + µ
b
k − µckt ≤ Π`t ∀t ∈ T [W `kt] (3.3a)
µakt + µ
b
k ≤ Πht ∀t ∈ T [Whkt] (3.3b)
−µakt − µdkt ≤ ξkt ∀t ∈ T [V +kt ] (3.3c)
µakt ≤ 0 ∀t ∈ T [V −kt ] (3.3d)
µakt + µ
b
k ≤ γt t ∈ T [Ukt] (3.3e)
µckt, µ
d
kt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T (3.3f)
Following constraints from (3.4a) to (3.4b) represent the complementary slackness condi-
tions for the constraints from (3.1d) to (3.1e). Constraints from (3.4c) to (3.4g) represents the
complementary slackness conditions for constraints from (3.3a) to (3.3f).
(
Ψ−W `kt
)
× µckt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4a)
(
ωkt − V +kt
)
× µdkt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4b)
(
Π`t − µakt − µbk + µckt
)
×W `kt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4c)
(
Πht − µakt − µbk
)
×Whkt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4d)
(
ξkt + µ
a
kt + µ
d
kt
)
× V +kt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4e)
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(
0− µakt
)
× V −kt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4f)
(
γt − µakt − µbk
)
× Ukt = 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.4g)
As we can see all of the complementary slackness constraints are non-linear. In the following
equations we will linearize the constraints using the big-M method. Big-M uses the arbitrary value
of M big enough to satisfy the constraints. To transform the non-linear constraints into linear
constraints we will be using the binary variable ρa,b,c,d,e,f,gkt for each of the constraints (3.4a), (3.4b),
(3.4c), (3.4d), (3.4e), (3.4f), and (3.4g) respectively. Following constraints represent the linear trans-
formulation of (3.4a) and (3.4g).
M × (1− ρakt) ≥ Ψ−W `kt, µckt ≤M × ρakt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5a)
M × (1− ρbkt) ≥ ωkt − V +kt , µ
d
kt ≤M × ρbkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5b)
M × (1− ρckt) ≥ Π`t − µakt − µbk + µckt, W `kt ≤M × ρckt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5c)
M × (1− ρdkt) ≥ Πht − µakt − µbk, Whkt ≤M × ρdkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5d)
M × (1− ρekt) ≥ ξkt + µakt + µdkt, V +kt ≤M × ρ
e
kt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5e)
M × (1− ρfkt) ≥ 0− µ
a
kt, V
−
kt ≤M × ρ
f
kt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5f)
M × (1− ρgkt) ≥ γt − µ
a
kt − µbk, Ukt ≤M × ρ
g
kt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.5g)
The objective functions (3.1a) and (3.2a) both contain the non-linear terms
∑
t∈T
[
Π`t ×
W `kt + Π
h
t ×Whkt
]
, this we can resolve using the strong duality condition for the follower’s problem as
it is a linear convex function. Following equation (3.6) represents the strong duality for the follower’s
objective function.
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∑
t∈T
[
Π`t ×W `kt + Πht ×Whkt + γ × Ukt
]
+
∑
t∈T
ξt × V +kt =∑
t∈T
[
dkt × µakt +Dk × µbk −Ψ× µckt − ωkt × µdkt
] (3.6)
Therefore we can rewrite the leader’s objective function (3.2a) as below using equation (3.6).
Max
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
[
dkt×µakt +Dk×µbk−Ψ×µckt−ωkt×µdkt−γ×Ukt−ξt×V +kt
]
−
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
cs×Yst (3.7)
3.3.1 Finding BIG-M
BIG-M is the arbitrary value for each of the respective constraints. It’s big enough not to
make the model infeasible. If the value chosen is too large, it may increase the computational time
of the model solving. Therefore, BIG-M shall be chosen carefully. For some of the constraints, these
values can be found from the structure of the problem. This can be easily done for the constraints
containing only primal variables of the followers’ problem. We explain this one by one as below.
For constraint (3.5a), W `kt is the amount of electricity consumed at lower prices which has
a maximum limit of Ψ so when W `kt = 0 the maximum value Ψ −W `kt can take is Ψ. Hence for
M × (1− ρakt) ≥ Ψ−W `kt, the M ← Ψ.
For constraint (3.5b), V +kt is the amount of electricity shifted upwards which has a maximum
capacity of ωkt so whenW
`
kt = 0 the maximum value ωkt−V
+
kt can take is ωkt. Hence forM×(1−ρbkt) ≥
ωkt − V +kt , the M ← ωkt.
For constraint (3.5c), W `kt is the amount of electricity consumed at lower prices which has a
maximum limit of Ψ therefore M ← Ψ.
For constraint (3.5d), W `kt is the amount of electricity consumed at higher prices. The
maximum requirement of energy at any hour after considering shifting of electricity is dkt +ωkt and
now W `kt is the electricity consumed at lower prices. So maximum energy consumed at higher prices
can be dkt + ωkt −Ψ. Hence for Whkt ≤M × ρdkt, the M ← dkt + ωkt −Ψ.
For constraint (3.5e), V +kt is the amount of electricity shifted upwards which has a maximum
capacity of ωkt thereby for V
+
kt ≤M×ρekt, theM ← ωkt. Similarly for constraint (3.5f), V
−
kt ≤M×ρ
f
kt,
the M ← dkt
For constraint (3.5g), Ukt is the amount of electricity consumed from competitor. The
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maximum requirement of energy at any hour after considering shifting of electricity is dkt + ωkt.
Hence for Ukt ≤M × ρgkt, the M ← dkt + ωkt.
Further in the section (3.4) we present the comprehensive MILP multi objective formulation
of the bilevel multi objective problem.
3.4 Comprehensive Formulation
Objective Functions
Max
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
[
dkt × µakt +Dk × µbk −Ψ× µckt − ωkt × µdkt − γt × Ukt − ξt × V +kt
]
−
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
cs × Yst
(3.8a)
Min
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
βs × Yst (3.8b)
Subject to:
Constraints Corresponding to Leader’s Problem
∑
k∈K
[
W `kt +W
h
kt
]
= Xt ∀t ∈ T (3.9a)
∑
s∈S
αs × Yst = Xt ∀t ∈ T (3.9b)
∣∣Π`t −Π`t+1∣∣ ≤ m× Pt ∀t ∈ T 3 t < |T | (3.9c)
∣∣Πht −Πht+1∣∣ ≤ m× Pt ∀t ∈ T 3 t < |T | (3.9d)
∑
t∈T
Pt ≤ N (3.9e)
Π`t ≤ Πht ∀t ∈ T (3.9f)
Π`t ,Π
h
t , Xt, Yst ≥ 0 ∀t, s (3.9g)
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Pt ∈ {0, 1} ∀t (3.9h)
Constraints Corresponding to Follower’s Problem
W `kt +W
h
kt + V
−
kt + Ukt = V
+
kt + dkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.10a)
∑
t∈T
[
W `kt +W
h
kt + Ukt
]
= Dk ∀k ∈ K (3.10b)
W `kt ≤ Ψ ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.10c)
V +kt ≤ ωkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.10d)
W `kt,W
h
kt, V
+
kt , V
−
kt , Ukt ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.10e)
Constraints Corresponding to KKT Conditions
µakt + µ
b
k − µckt ≤ Π`t ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11a)
µakt + µ
b
k ≤ Πht ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11b)
−µakt − µdkt ≤ ξkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11c)
µakt ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11d)
µakt + µ
b
k ≤ γt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11e)
µckt, µ
d
kt ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11f)
Ψ× (1− ρakt) ≥ Ψ−W `kt, µckt ≤M × ρakt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11g)
ωkt × (1− ρbkt) ≥ ωkt − V +kt , µ
d
kt ≤M × ρbkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11h)
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M × (1− ρckt) ≥ Π`t − µakt − µbk + µckt, W `kt ≤ Ψ× ρckt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11i)
M × (1− ρdkt) ≥ Πht − µakt − µbk, Whkt ≤ (dkt + ωkt −Ψ)× ρdkt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11j)
M × (1− ρekt) ≥ ξkt + µakt + µdkt, V +kt ≤ ωkt × ρ
e
kt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11k)
M × (1− ρfkt) ≥ 0− µ
a
kt, V
−
kt ≤ dkt × ρ
f
kt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11l)
M × (1− ρgkt) ≥ γt − µ
a
kt − µbk, Ukt ≤ (dkt + ωkt)× ρ
g
kt ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T (3.11m)
Let us call this model as Q. Q is a multi-objective and has a quadratic term [Ψ × µckt]
in function (3.8a). Thus the Q is a Mixed Integers Quadratic Objective Program (MIQP). The
function (3.8b) represents the amount of emissions (lbs) produced and the function (3.8a) represents
the profits in ¢. Thereby, we can make the Q into a single objective by adding a penalty, δ (¢/lbs),
to (3.8b). Thus Q will be a single objective MIQP having constraints from (3.9a) to (3.11m) and
objective function as below:
Max
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
[
dkt × µakt +Dk × µbk −Ψ× µckt − ωkt × µdkt − γt × Ukt − ξt × V +kt
]
−
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
cs × Yst − δ ×
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
βs × Yst
(3.12a)
The MIQP can be used as either as MIQP using Gurobi/CPLEX or we use the search
method to find the optimal value of Ψ and then solve the Q at the optimal Ψ and thus the objective
(3.12a) will be a linear function for the given Ψ. We present the search method in the next chapter,
Experiment Setup.
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Chapter 4
Experiment Setup
Our aim of the problem is to gauge the impacts of carbon emissions; therefore, we will
be comparing two models. One considering impacts of carbon emission, let’s call it model With
Carbon Emissions (With CE). The second model does not account the carbon emissions, let’s call
this Without Carbon Emissions (Without CE). Both models are the same except for the objective
function.
With CE is model Q as presented in section (3.4). Without CE does not account carbon
emissions so it will have constraints from (3.9a) to (3.11m) and objective function as below. Let us
call this model L.
Max
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
[
dkt × µakt +Dk × µbk −Ψ× µckt − ωkt × µdkt − γt × Ukt − ξt × V +kt
]
−
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
cs × Yst
(4.1a)
Next, we present the data preparation, Optimal Ψ search method, and then discuss the
Results with sensitivity analysis.
4.1 Data Preparation
For the experiments, we focused on industrial customers located in South Carolina, USA.
We have collected the annual demand data from the [Data and IAC, ]. There are 149 data points
available. Due to computational ease, we are taking a subset of 50 customers from those 149
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customers i.e., K = 50. We calculated the daily demand from the annual demand. Since we do
not have any demand profiles available so based on these 149 data points, we randomly generated
demand profiles, dkt of each customer for T = 24. Then we summed the randomly generated demand
profiles over t to get the Dt. Table-4.1 shows the distribution of the daily demand. We can see there
is a huge variation in daily demand, which is good for our experiment as in real life as well, the
retailer will have a huge spectrum of daily demand variation.
Customers (K) Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
50 446,534 621,102 12,931 2,628,417
Table 4.1: Summary of daily demand Dk
We assumed the retailer uses the Coal, Gas, and Oil for electricity generation. Therefore,
we have S = 3 different types of fuels. Table-4.2 shows the summary of fuels. We collected the data
for these fuels from the U.S. Energy Information Agency website. Natural gas is the most efficient
fuel when emissions are considered. However, when emissions are not considered, then Coal is the
most efficient fuel source.
Fuel Unit Price ¢
(cs)
kWh
αs
CO2
βs
kWh/CO2/¢ kWh/¢
Coal Ton 3,925 5,543.44 4,086 0.0345% 141.23%
Gas Thousand ft3 283 301.86 121 0.8815% 106.66%
Oil Barrel 5,682 1,630.13 824 0.0348% 28.68%
Table 4.2: Fuels used for electricity production
We assumed the competitor’s TOU price structure (γt) as follow.
12AM-3AM 4AM-7AM 8AM-12PM 1AM-6PM 7PM-9PM 10PM-11PM
10 15 20 10 15 10
Table 4.3: Competitor’s prices, γt (¢/kWh)
The inconvenience caused to customers due to demand shifting is a utility function. We
assumed the equivalent cost should be added to customers’ objective function to account for the
inconvenience of customers. Therefore, we assumed ξkt is a function of dkt as ξkt =
dkt
maxt∈Tdkt
∀k, t.
Using this the maximum inconvenience cost incurred by any customer during any hour is ξ12,11 = 1¢
and the average inconvenience cost is approx. 0.50 ¢. Further as are imposing a penalty on emissions
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for model Q, we assumed δ = 10 (¢/lbs) for the experiment. However, this we will be changing in
the sensitivity analysis to measure the impacts of penalty.
We could not get real-life data for the experiment; however, it would not impact our analysis.
As we aim to gauge the impacts of emissions i.e., comparing models Q and L, therefore our results
will still be applicable as both the models will be solved with same data inputs.
4.2 Optimal Ψ Search Method
Our both the models Q and L are MIQCP because of the term [Ψ × µckt] in the objective
functions and Ψ terms in KKT conditions. Ψ is a leader’s decision variable. It represents the limit
of the customers’ electricity consumption up to which lower unit price, Π`t , will be applicable. This
limit is the same for all of the customers. The lower-limit is an important decision made by the
leader as setting it too low will imply the customers have to consume more electricity at higher
prices, which may force the customers to buy electricity from the competitor. Similarly, if the value
of Ψ is too high, it will imply more electricity consumption at lower unit rates; thus, the leader may
miss on potential profits.
Ψ defines the limit on hourly electricity consumption by the customers at lower prices Π`t .
Therefore, we first look at the hourly demand distribution of all the customers in Figure-1. We can
see huge variations as the maximum demand is more than 200,000 kWh/hr, and the third quartile
range is around 40,000 kWh/h. Therefore for the optimal Ψ search either we can search values
between dminkt and d
max
kt or we can take Low, Medium, & High Ψ values for our experiments.
Figure 4.1: Hourly demand distribution of customers
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First, we searched for the optimal Ψ between the range of dkt. Figure-4.2 shows the profits
and emission costs for both With CE and Without CE models. The y-axis shows the profits/emission
costs in (¢) and x-axis shows the different Ψ values between the range dkt. As we can see, the profits
and emission costs for the respective model are not changing much. This is because of the reason
that retailer can maintain the profits for respective models by changing the Π`t and Π
h
t at different
Ψ. The total demand is satisfied by the retailer. Since the retailer does not have any constraint on
the supply of the fuel sources, emission levels remain almost constant. This behavior we discuss in
detail in section-4.3. Here we are searching for the optimal Ψ only.
Figure 4.2: Optimal Ψ search
Since profits/costs almost remain constant and for numerical analysis ease we can chose
Low, Medium, & High Ψ values. Fig-1 shows that ’Low’ Ψ = 5, 000(kWh) includes approximately
5% of the total daily demand. Similarly, ’Medium’ Ψ = 70, 000(kWh) includes approximately 50%
and ’High’ Ψ = 180, 000(kWh) includes approximately 95% of the total daily demand. These are
quite reasonable values for our analysis. Low implies 95% total daily demand shall be satisfied at
Πht and High implies 5% total daily demand satisfied at Π
`
t. Next, we present our detailed analysis
based on these Ψ values.
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4.3 Results
Models Q and L each has K = 50, T = 24, S = 3. Thereby each model has 9,794 continuous
variables, 8,424 binary variables, and 26,615 constraints. We are solving this model with Gurobi
9.0.1 with script language Python 3.7 on a computer with 1.6 GHz Intel i5 8th generation CPU and
8 GB RAM. We have used Gurobi’s MIPGap = 1% as the termination criteria, representing the
relative gap between the objective value obtained and the best objective bound found in the branch
and cut algorithm.
Table-4.4 summarizes the computational time and the relative optimality gap for both With
CE and Without CE models. We have an optimality gap of less than 1% for all the models, so
we have obtained a solution closer to the optimality. The computational time varies with the choice
of Ψ value. At Low Ψ value models are solved in around 3,800 seconds, and at High Ψ, the time
taken is around 2,100 seconds; however, at the Medium Ψ the time taken is around 100 seconds.
This indicates that the choice of Ψ value impacts the models’ computational time for the same
termination criteria. Further, we also observed from the Gurobi log output (Appendices-A) that we
have a tight formulation, and the best objective is found often by heuristics.
With CE Without CE
Ψ Value Time (Sec) Gap (%) Time (Sec) Gap (%)
Low 3,233 0.19% 3,800 0.07%
Medium 101 0.02% 99 0.01%
High 1,127 0.92% 2,133 0.45%
Table 4.4: Computational performance
Following Table-4.9 shows the profits and emission costs of the retailer for both the models Q
and L. In the table Profits represent the net profits of the retailer without considering the emissions
i.e. Profits = Revenue - Fuel Cost. Em-Cost represents the emission costs i.e. δ×
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S βs×
Yst. Wt-Profits represents the weighted profits after considering emission costs i.e. Wt-Profits =
Profits - Em-Cost. The values shown in the table are represented in million ¢. First, we observe
that the Profits are higher for Medium Ψ by approx. 0.50% in each case. This was also observed
from Figure-4.2 that a Ψ between Low and High value gives slightly higher profits.
Second, the Profits for Without CE model are higher than the With CE by more than 2% for
each Ψ. This would indicate Without CE model, yields higher profits if the cost for emissions were
not to be considered. However, consideration of emission leads to With CE model yielding higher
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With CE Without CE
ΨValues Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.78 89.49 152.29 246.79 164.57 82.22
Medium 242.92 89.49 153.43 248.04 164.57 83.47
High 241.54 89.49 152.05 246.93 164.57 82.36
Table 4.5: Weighted profits and emission cost comparison (million ¢)
weighted profits by approx. 85% compared to Without CE. The reason for this can be attributed
to fuel sources used. Given no constraint on fuel supply, With CE uses Natural Gas to satisfy the
demand as Natural Gas has higher efficiency compared to other fuels (Table-4.2). This is evident
from the fact that Em-Cost for With CE model is lower by approx. 84% compared to Without
CE model. Thus, we can consider that considering emissions into price settings leads to improved
weighted profits and lower emission costs. The weighted profits and profits are increased with Ψ,
and after optimal value, profits start decreasing.
Before proceeding further, let us look at the customers’ demand shifted behaviors as further
results are better explained based on the demand shift behavior of the customers. Figure-4.3 rep-
resents the demand shifted by the customers. The downward shift means customers will consume
that energy at some other hours. As we can see from the ’Downward Shift’ all of the demand shift
happens between t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11, 12} because during this period the price of competitor is too high
i.e. γt = 20, t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11, 12} (Table-4.3). The downward shifted demand is consumed during
other hours, as shown in the ’Upward Shift’ figure.
(a) Downward Shift (b) Upward Shift
Figure 4.3: Total demand shifted throughout the day
Further, the emission costs do not seem to impact the customer’s behavior of demand shifts
much, as shown in Table-4.6 and Figure-4.4. The maximum demand shift occurs at Low Ψ, which
is quite intuitive, as we will see from Figure-4.6. The retailer sets the TLOU prices equal to the
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Models Low Ψ Medium Ψ High Ψ
With CE 14.50% 20.15% 14.18%
Without CE 14.23% 20.15% 14.61%
Table 4.6: % of total demand shifted
competitor, thus encouraging customers to move to low energy consumption time hours, which is
not in the case of Low Ψ and Medium Ψ where retailer uses marginally lower prices compared to the
competitor (Figures-4.5 & 4.7). The customers with high demand have the most inconvenience cost,
as shown in Figure-4.4. For example, at Medium Ψ, customer 46 has the highest inconvenience cost.
The customer would minimize the consumption cost by 10.80% compared to the cost, if electricity
were to buy from the competitor. The customer does this by paying just 0.82% inconvenience cost
of the electricity consumption cost.
From competitor From retailer
Total Cost Electricity Cost Inconvenience Cost Total Cost % Cost Savings
28.81 25.49 0.21 25.70 10.80%
Table 4.7: Customers’ cost comparison, competitor vs retailer (million ¢)
Figure 4.4: Total inconvenience cost incurred by the customers
The retailer uses different TLOU prices based on Ψ level. Low Ψ implies the customer has
to either consume electricity from competitor or from at higher prices from the retailer. Thus, to
to retain more demand, the retailer sets prices competitively lower than the competitor as evident
from the Figure-4.5. The retailer sets Π`t = Π
h
t = 15¢ < γt = 20¢ ∀t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 12} and for rest
t all the unit prices equal. Moreover, the retailer uses the same TLOU prices for both With CE
and Without CE models. From Figure-4.3(a) it has become clear why the retailer uses lower prices
compared to the competitor setting and the maximum inconvenience cost incurred is 1¢thus making
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Π`t + ξkt = Π
h
t + ξkt < γt ∀t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 12}. This encourages the customers to shift the energy to
lower price periods and reducing the peaks during high price period. As we will see in Figure-4.8,
despite of shifting the electricity during high price times, the customers are always able to maintain
the minimum costs.
(a) Unit rates at low Ψ (b) Total demand consumption at low Ψ
Figure 4.5: Unit price vs demand consumption at low Ψ
However, at Medium Ψ the retailer uses the different prices during t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 12} as
evident from the Figure-4.6. From Table-4.6, we see that maximum percentage of demand shift,
20%, happens at Medium Ψ. The reason for this is retailer setting the prices equal or more than
the competitor which was not the case for Low Ψ. For Medium Ψ, retailer sets the lower unit prices
equal to the competitor i.e. Π`t = γt∀t for With CE and Without CE models. However uses different
higher unit prices for certain hours i.e. Πht = 30¢ ∀t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 12} for Without CE model and
Πht = 30¢ ∀t ∈ {8, 10, 12} for With CE model. The demand satisfied at lower and higher price is
same thus we can say at Medium Ψ there exists the alternate optimal solutions.
(a) Unit rates at medium Ψ (b) Total demand consumption at medium Ψ
Figure 4.6: Unit price vs demand Consumption at medium Ψ
For High Ψ, the retailer uses quite dynamic TLOU prices, as shown in Figure-4.7(a); how-
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ever, the prices used for both the models are the same. The retailer’s maximum price is Πh = 30¢
during a few hours of the day. Also the for t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11, 12} retailer sets prices lower than the
competitor i.e. Πh = 15 < γ = 20. This is like what we have seen for Low Ψ. The only difference
is at Low Ψ major demand has to be satisfied at higher prices. Thereby, the retailer could not use
dynamic pricing; however, for High Ψ, most of the demand is satisfied at lower prices, thus giving
the retailer the flexibility to set higher prices. Consideration of emission into price-setting does not
seem to impact the demand consumption behavior, as shown in Figure-4.7(b). This is again like
what we have observed for Low Ψ.
(a) Unit rates at high Ψ (b) Total demand consumption at high Ψ
Figure 4.7: Unit price vs demand consumption at high Ψ
The customers’ cost, including the inconvenience cost, does not seem to vary much, as
evident from the Figure-4.8(a). At different Ψ there is a small variation in the cost of customers,
which is like what has been observed in [Anjosa et al., ]. For example, customers 2 and 46 experience
marginal higher costs (approx. 2%-5% higher) at Medium Ψ in both models than other Ψ.
(a) Total cost (b) % change at different Ψ
Figure 4.8: Customers cost comparison for With CE and Without CE
Further, emission costs do not affect the customers’ consumption cost significantly, as shown
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in the Figure-4.8(b). The figure shows the percentage change in customers’ cost of Without CE model
compared to With CE model at different Ψ values. The emission cost does not impact customers’
cost at Medium Ψ, and for other Ψ, it only affects marginally. Thus, we can say customers almost
have the same consumption costs for all Ψ values irrespective of the emissions. Also, if the customers
buy electricity from the retailers, they save an average of 10% total cost, including inconvenience
cost compared to the total cost paid to the competitor Figure-4.9. The % savings are also the same
for both the models at different Ψ.
Figure 4.9: % Total cost saved compared to the competitor
From our experimental analysis of both the models, we can say a few things about the
impacts of the emissions into price settings. First, considering emissions into price-setting improves
the weighted profits of the retailer. The weighted profits are improved by more than 80% for the With
CE model compared to Without CE. Second, Medium Ψ value marginally improves both profits and
weighted profits irrespective of the impacts of carbon emissions. Medium Ψ yields approximately
0.50% higher profits than those obtained at extreme values of Ψ. Also, at Medium Ψ, unit prices
have alternative solutions. Last, the customers also benefit by shifting some of the demand to low
price periods, thereby reducing the retailer’s demand peaks. The customers save by an average
of 10% by participating in the TLOU price structure. Also, the cost savings of the customers do
not seem to be affected by the consideration of the emissions into prices-setting; however, we will
verify this in our sensitivity analysis. In the next section, we present the sensitivity of results stated
here by changing few parameters considered essential for the models such as cost of emissions (δ),
inconvenience cost (ξkt), and considering constrain on the fuel source available. The above results
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we referred to as base case scenario for sensitivity analysis purpose.
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis
We will be performing several sensitivity analyses on both the models by changing a param-
eter or including some constraints. In the models, we have not included the fuel supply constraint,
including it may impact the models’ economic performance. In the following parts, we will discuss
the impacts of those parameters on both the models.
4.3.1.1 Fuel Supply Restrictions
Some of the thermal power plants uses single fuel to meet the electricity demand and some
uses a combination of both (Wikipedia). Therefore, it’s better to check how the fuel supply constraint
will impact the economical performance of the models. The fuel supply constraint can be included
as
∑
t∈T Yst ≤ qs ∀s ∈ S in both the models Q and L. Here qs is the maximum fuel supply
available. From Wikipedia, we have collected the average fuel supply as qs ∈ {50%, 60%, 20%}∀s ∈
{Coal,Natural Gas,Oil}. The % represents the total supply required to meet x% of the total demand.
Including this constraint we have obtained the profits and emission costs as shown in Table-4.8.
With CE
Base Case Supply Constraint Included
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.78 89.49 152.29 244.97 119.52 125.44
Medium 242.92 89.49 153.43 244.97 119.52 125.44
High 241.54 89.49 152.05 243.75 119.52 124.22
Without CE
Base Case Supply Constraint Included
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 246.79 164.57 82.22 244.19 127.04 117.15
Medium 248.04 164.57 83.47 245.48 127.04 118.44
High 246.93 164.57 82.36 245.48 127.04 118.44
Table 4.8: Fuel supply constrained scenario, profits & cost (million ¢) comparison
Including the supply constraint into the models, we can see that for With CE model, the
profits have increased by approx. 1.30% for each Ψ compared to the base case scenario. However,
weighted profits have reduced by more than 20% because of the increased cost of emissions. The
emission costs increase by an average of 25% as now the retailer has to use the mix of fuels with
different efficiencies compared to only Natural Gas when no supply restrictions were considered in
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the base case scenario. In contrast to the With CE model, the emission costs have now decreased
for Without CE model by approx. 30% compared to the base case. Again, the reason is using a
mix of different fuel sources compared to only coal is used in the base case scenario. This has also
led to an increase in weighted profits by 30% compared to the base case scenario. Thus, we can
say that if the retailer wants to consider emissions into price-setting, then the retailer shall use the
most efficient fuel like Natural Gas to meet the demand requirements. However, if emissions were
not considered, the retailer would use the mix of fuels to meet the daily demand.
If we compare With CE to Without CE for the supply-constrained scenario, then we can
still see that including the emission costs into price-setting improves the weighted profits for With
CE model. However, the improvement is between 5%-7% compared to the 85% improvement in
the base case scenario. The reason is the same, increased emission costs for With CE model and
decreased emission costs for the Without CE model.
With CE Without CE
ΨValues Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
5 heightLow 244.97 119.52 125.44 244.19 127.04 117.15
Medium 244.97 119.52 125.44 245.48 127.04 118.44
High 243.75 119.52 124.22 245.48 127.04 118.44
Table 4.9: Fuel supply constrained scenario (Values in million ¢)
There is also a change observed in the demand shift behavior of the customers, as shown in
the Table-4.10. Compared to the base case scenario where customers were shifting more demand at
Medium Ψ (Table-4.6), now it is done at Low and Medium Ψ for With CE model and at Medium
and High Ψ for Without CE model.
Models Low Ψ Medium Ψ High Ψ
With CE 20.15% 20.15% 14.30%
Without CE 14.20% 20.15% 20.15%
Table 4.10: Fuel supply constrained scenario, demand shift behaviour
The reason is attributed to setting of different prices compared to base case scenario. For
Low Ψ now the retailer sets the prices equal to the competitor i.e. Π`t = Π
h
t = γt ∀t for With
CE model which was not the case for base case scenario i.e. Π`t = Π
h
t = 15¢ < γt = 20¢ ∀t ∈
{8, 9, 10, 12}. This is also shown in Figure-4.10. Same for Without CE at High Ψ.
The customer total cost almost remains the same varying between 0-2%, and the % they
save compared to the competitor’s price also remains the same. From this analysis, we can say
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(a) Base case scenario (b) Fuel supply constrained scenario
Figure 4.10: Fuel supply constrained scenario, different prices at low Ψ
even if the retailer uses the mix of fuels to meet the demand, the weighted profits are improved
for With CE model by an average of 5%-7%. However, this is quite low compared to the base
case scenario where weighted profits were 85% higher than the Without CE model. The significant
impact by considering limits on fuel is seen in the emission costs. For With CE model, we see a rise
in emission cost by 25%; however, for Without CE model, the emission costs are reduced by 30%.
Customers’ demand shift behavior also changed because the retailer uses different prices at different
Ψ level compared to the base case scenario. However, the total consumption costs of the customer
remain unaffected marginally, changing by 0-2%. When fuel restrictions are considered, including
the emission costs into the objective function, there is a shift observed in hourly emissions generated
i.e., during peak hours, we will see fewer emissions [Zhang et al., 2014]. We also observe the same
pattern, as can be seen from Figure-4.11 for hours between 08:00 AM to 12:00 PM.
4.3.1.2 Changing Cost of Emissions δ
Now we see the sensitivity of the models by changing the emission costs(δ). For further
analysis we have reverted back to our original models Q and L i.e. the fuel supply constraint∑
t∈T Yst ≤ qs ∀s ∈ S has been removed. For the base case scenario we have considered δ = 10¢.
We are now considering high emission cost as δh = 15¢ and low as δ` = 5¢.
1. Low Emission Cost, δ` = 5¢
We have reduced the unit emission cost by 50%, and there is no constraint on fuel source
used, so it is anticipated that the total emission costs for With CE and Without CE shall also be
reduced by 50% compared to the base case scenario. Indeed, this is true; as can be seen from Table-
4.11, the emission costs have reduced by 50% for both the models compared to the respective base
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Figure 4.11: Fuel supply constrained scenario, shift in hourly emissions
case scenario. The weighted profits have improved significantly in this scenario. While weighted
profits were increased by approximately 30% for With CE, Without CE has observed an increase of
100% compared to the base case scenario. This is because of the low efficiency of coal, thus produces
more emission per unit kWh(Table-4.2). However, the total profits have not changed and almost
remained the same as in the base case scenario.
With CE
Base Case Low Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.78 89.49 152.29 241.60 44.75 196.85
Medium 242.92 89.49 153.43 242.92 44.75 198.17
High 241.54 89.49 152.05 242.92 44.75 198.17
Without CE
Base Case Low Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 246.79 164.57 82.22 247.10 82.28 164.82
Medium 248.04 164.57 83.47 248.04 82.28 165.76
High 246.93 164.57 82.36 248.04 82.28 165.76
Table 4.11: Profits & cost (million ¢) comparison at low emission cost δ = 5¢
If we compare the With CE and Without CE model for low emission cost scenario only,
then again, we see the consideration of emissions into price-setting leads to higher weighted profits
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for the retailer. In this scenario, the weighted profits are more by 19.50% for With CE compared to
Without CE model, although this increase was approximately 85% in the base case scenario. Thus
supporting our observation of including emission into price-setting leads to the improved profits for
the retailer.
With CE Without CE
ΨValues Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.60 44.75 196.85 247.10 82.28 164.82
Medium 242.92 44.75 198.17 248.04 82.28 165.76
High 242.92 44.75 198.17 248.04 82.28 165.76
Table 4.12: Low emission cost scenario, (values in million ¢)
Further, at the low emission cost, the demand shifting behavior has changed compared to
the base case scenarios and fuel supply constraint considerations. As shown in Table-4.13, at low
emission costs, the customers shift more electricity at Medium and High Ψ for both models. At Low
Ψ, Without CE model has comparatively larger demand shifts than the base case scenario and fuel
supply constraint. This is because of different rate settings for different Ψ at the low emission cost
compared to the base case and fuel supply constraint scenarios.
Models Low Ψ Medium Ψ High Ψ
With CE 14.19% 20.15% 20.15%
Without CE 17.07% 20.15% 20.15%
Table 4.13: Low emission cost scenario, demand shift behaviour
Customers’ total electricity cost and % cost saving compared to the competitor remain
unaffected. From this analysis, we can conclude that even the cost of emission reduces, the retailer
observes the improved profits while considering the emissions into price setting. With CE, weighted
profits are higher by approx. 19.50% than With CE, although it is significantly less than the base case
scenario i.e., 85% nonetheless higher than the fuel supply constraint i.e., 5%-7%. For low emission
cost scenario, Without CE model observes the 100% increment in weighted profits compared to the
base case scenario and With CE only observes the 30% increment. This is because coal produces
more emissions than natural gas; thus, low emission costs significantly impact the profits of Without
CE model.
2 High Emission Cost, δh = 15¢
We have increased the unit emission cost by 50% and there is no constraint on fuel source
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used so it is anticipated that the total emission costs for With CE and Without CE shall also be
increased by 50% compared to the base case scenario, Table-4.14. The the emission costs have
increased by 50% for both the models compared to respective base case scenario. As for the low
emission cost the weighted profits improved, the high emission costs have lowered the weighted
profits for both the models. The weighted profits were decreased by approx. 30% and 100% for
With CE and Without CE respectively. The % change is same as observed for low emission cost.
With CE
Base Case High Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.78 89.49 152.29 241.92 134.24 107.68
Medium 242.92 89.49 153.43 242.92 134.24 108.67
High 241.54 89.49 152.05 242.92 134.24 108.67
Without CE
Base Case High Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 246.79 164.57 82.22 247.10 246.85 0.25
Medium 248.04 164.57 83.47 248.04 246.85 1.22
High 246.93 164.57 82.36 248.04 246.85 1.99
Table 4.14: Profits & cost (million ¢) comparison at high emission cost δ = 15¢
If we compare the With CE and Without CE model for high emission cost scenario only, then
the weighted profits are indicatively too high for the With CE model, thus suggesting to consider
emissions into price-setting if the emission costs are too high i.e., are close to the unit prices of
the electricity. The rest of the costs and trends follow the same trend as that of the low emission
cost scenario. Thereby, from the sensitivity check of emission costs on the models, we can conclude
the retailer should consider the emission cost into price-setting, and when the emission costs are
too high, then it became inevitable as the weighted profits for Without CE models are lower by a
range of 90% to 400% at different values of Ψ. Second, the customers’ demand shifting patterns
are unaffected by the emission cost variation, and there is no change observed in the electricity cost
of the customers. Thus, we can say the emission cost seems to affect the leader’s problem more
significantly than the followers’ problem. The cost savings on emissions are approx. 45% in With
CE model compared to Without CE model between a range of low and high emission costs, thus
most obviously, the lower the emission costs is beneficial for the retailers as the gain in weighted
profits is 30% compared to the base case scenario.
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4.3.1.3 Changing Cost of Inconvenience ξkt
Now let us check how the demand shift inconvenience cost, ξkt, affects the profits and costs of
the customers. This is an important parameter in the model as if the perceived cost of demand shift
is too high for the customers then they would shift the demand to the competitor. The successive
price change in the competitor’s price is either 5¢or 10¢(Table-4.3) and the maximum inconvenience
cost across the customers is 1¢, we chose the high and low inconvenience cost as ξhkt =
dkt∗5
maxt∈Tdkt
∀k, t
and ξ`kt =
dkt
maxt∈Tdkt∗5∀k, t respectively. Next we analyse the model behaviour at those inconvenience
costs.
1. Low Inconvenience Cost, ξ`kt
At the low inconvenience costs, we do not observe any significant changes in the profits,
weighted profits, or the emission costs for both the models. An important observation is in the base
case scenario; we have profits and weighted profits higher at the Medium Ψ; however, at the low
inconvenience cost, profits are the same at all different values of Ψ. Thereby the total profits at
Low and Medium Ψ improved by 0.50% and 1.50% for With CE and Without CE models for low
inconvenience cost scenario compared to the base case scenario.
With CE
Base Case Low Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.78 89.49 152.29 242.92 89.50 153.42
Medium 242.92 89.49 153.43 242.92 89.50 153.42
High 241.54 89.49 152.05 242.92 89.50 153.42
Without CE
Base Case Low Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 246.79 164.57 82.22 248.04 164.57 83.47
Medium 248.04 164.57 83.47 248.04 164.57 83.47
High 246.93 164.57 82.36 248.04 164.57 83.47
Table 4.15: Profits & cost (million ¢) comparison at low inconvenience cost, ξ`kt
Consistent to the same profits at all Ψ for both the models, the demand shift behavior is
also the same, 20.15%, total demand is shifted in both the models for all values of Ψ. Further
reducing the inconvenience cost should impact the customers’ total cost as these are the ones that
are directly impacted by inconvenience cost. Table-4.16 represents the total cost break of customer
46. Compared to the base case scenario (Table-4.7), the total inconvenience has decreased by 80%.
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The total cost saving of the customer has increased from 10.80% to 11.42% at low inconvenience
cost compared to the base case scenario.
From competitor From retailer
Total Cost Electricity Cost Inconvenience Cost Total Cost % Cost Savings
28.81 25.49 0.04 25.52 11.42%
Table 4.16: Low inconvenience cost, customers cost breakup (million ¢)
From this, we can infer that if all the customers are willing to reduce the demand peaks or
shift the demands, the lower limits do not affect the retailer’s profits. As stated in [Anjosa et al., ],
the TLOU price structure is more effective if customers are willing to shift more demand. However,
this observation was made in a competitive environment where the competitor has a single price
throughout the day, but from our analysis, we can say if the retailer operates in a TOU compet-
itive environment price structure, then TLOU does not really improve the profits. Our original
observation is still valid. The consideration of emissions into price-setting improves the weighted
profits of the retailer. Moreover, the customers have lower inconvenience costs and thus reduces
their respective total costs compared to the base case scenario.
2. High Inconvenience Cost, ξhkt
Contrary to the low inconvenience cost, here we see that the retailer observes the higher
profits at Medium Ψ as is observed in the base case scenario.
With CE
Base Case Low Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 241.78 89.49 152.29 242.78 89.50 153.28
Medium 242.92 89.49 153.43 243.37 89.50 153.87
High 241.54 89.49 152.05 242.78 89.50 153.28
Without CE
Base Case Low Emission Cost
Ψ Values Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits Profits Em-Cost Wt-Profits
Low 246.79 164.57 82.22 247.34 164.57 82.78
Medium 248.04 164.57 83.47 248.22 164.57 83.65
High 246.93 164.57 82.36 247.86 164.57 83.29
Table 4.17: Profits & cost (million ¢) comparison at high inconvenience cost, ξhkt
Compared to the profits for low inconvenience cost scenario(Table-4.15), the weighted profits
for With CE and Without CE for high inconvenience cost scenario have increased marginally by
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0.30% and 0.22% respectively for Medium Ψ and reverse is true for other Ψ values. Also, the profits,
weighted profits, and emission cost do not much significantly compared to the base case scenario.
The weighted profits remain 84% higher compared to the Without CE model in this scenario
as well as supporting our observation of improved profits on consideration of emissions into price
setting. Further, there is variation in demand shift behavior of customers at higher inconvenience
cost, as shown in Table-4.18. The maximum demand shift (16.62%) happens at Medium Ψ for With
CE model. At low inconvenience cost, there is a uniform demand shift (20.15%) across the Ψ values
for both the models. The reason seems apparent. There is a difference in price setting for low and
high inconvenience cost scenarios, as shown in Figure-4.12.
Models Low Ψ Medium Ψ High Ψ
With CE 14.54% 16.62% 14.54%
Without CE 14.29% 14.79% 14.51%
Table 4.18: High inconvenience cost, demand shift behaviour
(a) ξ`kt- Low Ψ (b) ξ
h
kt- Low Ψ
(c) ξ`kt- Medium Ψ (d) ξ
h
kt- Medium Ψ
Figure 4.12: High inconvenience cost, unit price comparison
From Figure-4.12, it is evident when customers are more willing to shift demand, the retailer
sets prices equal to the competitor (Figure-4.12 (a) & (c)) however when the customer are less willing
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the retailer uses different prices for both the models and in each cases the prices set are lower than the
competitor for few hours i.e. Π`t = Π
h
t < γ∀t ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11, 12} thus customers are less encouraged
to shift electricity. For With CE Medium Ψ maximum shift happens because retailer uses higher
prices (17¢) than Without CE (16¢) for these hours. The increased inconvenience cost led to decrease
in the % cost saving in customers total cost compared to base case scenario and low inconvenience
cost scenario(Table-4.19).
From competitor From retailer
Total Cost Electricity Cost Inconvenience Cost Total Cost % Cost Savings
28.81 25.57 0.52 26.09 9.44%
Table 4.19: Low inconvenience cost, customers cost breakup (million ¢)
In the base case scenario, the customer savings were 10.80%, which increased to 11.42%
for low inconvenience cost scenarios. However, it has even decreased than the base case scenario to
9.44%, which is also evident from the Figure-4.13.
(a) Low inconvenience cost scenario
(b) High inconvenience cost scenario
Figure 4.13: Customers total cost change comparison for scenarios
Thus from this analysis, we can conclude a few things. First, considering emissions into price-
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setting still improves the profit for With CE model by approx. 85%. The retailer’s profits remain
significantly unaffected with the change in the cost of inconvenience. However, if the customers are
more willing to shift the electricity i.e., low inconvenience costs, then Ψ does not have a significant
role in improving the profits implying TLOU does not have any role to play in a TOU competitive
environment. Second, the inconvenience cost does not affect the emissions generated. We do not
see the shift of demand from the retailer to the competitor. Thereby all of the demand is satisfied
by the retailer. This is achieved by setting prices lower than the competitor for a few hours of the
day(Figure-4.12). Third, the inconvenience costs affect the total costs of the customers. The % of
total cost saving for the customer compared to the competitor changes form 11.42% to 9.44% for
low inconvenience costs to high inconvenience costs, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Discussion
5.1 Answering the Research Questions
We aimed to investigate the impacts of carbon emissions on electricity price-setting when a
retailer operates in a competitive environment. The idea was to use a DR tool to minimize the cost of
carbon emissions, maximize the retailer’s profits, and minimize the total costs of the customers. From
our base case scenario analysis, we found that considering the emissions into the price-setting helps
the retailer to improve weighted profits by more than 85% compared to the prices when emissions
are not considered. The increase in weighted profits varied between 5%-85% based on different
parameter inputs; however, the retailer optimizes the weighted profits in all situations. Also, the
cost of emissions was reduced between the same range. Carbon emissions were reduced with the
choice of more efficient fuel in terms of kWh/CO2/¢. Customers’ total cost remains unaffected with
the consideration of emissions; however, changes significantly with the willingness to shift demand
from price period to low price period. The customer saved on an average 10% in total costs by
participating in demand management practice.
5.2 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have presented a new framework that allows the retailer to ascertain the
impacts of carbon emission into the electricity price-setting. The retailer can maximize its profits
with the inclusion of emissions as weighted profits into the objective while providing additional
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savings to the customers.
We presented a bilevel optimization model in which the retailer seeks to compare emissions
model that considers the weighted sum of profits and emissions as the objective function to the one
that considers only profits. The retailer aims to maximize profits after including the emissions as the
weighted sum, and the customers seek to minimize their costs. In the bilevel models, the customers
can either buy electricity from the retailer or from the competitor who uses the Time-of-Use (TOU)
policy. The retailer considers the customers’ flexibility for demand shifting to reduce the on-peak
demand fluctuations. Thus the flexibility of the customers to shift the demand has been perceived as
an inconvenience as they have to alter their operations. Therefore, we consider an inconvenience cost
in addition to electricity consumption cost into the lower-level problem’s objective function. Then
we reformulated the bilevel models into a single-level problem using KKT conditions to generate
the lower-level problem’s optimality. Afterward, we apply a standard big-M method to linearize the
non-linear constraints resulting from the KKT complementary slackness conditions into a mixed-
integer linear programming (MILP) model. We solve this MILP using on-the-shelf solvers for an
extensive set of instances using real-world data from the IAC database. For the ease of users, we use
’With CE’ term for the model considering emissions and ’Without CE’ for the one not considering
emissions.
From our analysis, we observed that the retailer’s weighted profits for With CE are improved
by approx. 85% compared to Without CE model. The choice of fuel affects the profits of the retailer.
Like for With CE model, the retailer uses natural gas, and Without CE model, coal is used to satisfy
the demand. Thus, total emissions generated are lower for With CE by 85% compared to Without
CE. The customers were able to reduce their costs by approximately 10.80% compared to what they
would have paid to the competitor without shifting the demand. The customers reduce their total
cost by shifting their demands, and the inconvenience cost incurred is less than 1% of the cost of
electricity consumed. To validate our results, we have performed a sensitivity analysis on fuel supply,
cost of emissions, and customers’ inconvenience cost.
In the first instance, we consider restrictions on the fuel supply i.e., the retailer has specific
capacities of each fuel type to generate electricity, and no single fuel is sufficient to meet the total
demand. This leads to a 25% increase in emissions cost for the With CE model, as the retailer uses
a mix of natural gas and coal to satisfy the demand compared to the use of natural gas initially.
Similarly, the emissions cost has decreased by 30% for Without CE model. Due to this variation
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in emission costs, the weighted profits for With CE for the retailer are only 7% higher compared
to 85% initially. Nonetheless, even if the fuel restrictions are included, the retailer has improved
profits for With CE model compared to Without CE. The customers’ costs remain unaffected. From
these analyses, we can say that consideration of emissions leads to improved weighted profits for the
retailer.
In the second instance, we change the cost of emissions to high and low. The change in
emission cost does not affect the lower-level problem significantly. The only change in lower-level
observed is the behavior of the demand shift of the customers. The retailer uses different TLOU
prices for low and high emission costs, thus encouraging the customers to shift demand accordingly,
and the total cost of the customers remain unchanged. The emission cost is considered into the
retailer’s objective; thereby, it affects the retailer’s weighted profits more significantly. The weighted
profits for the retailer are higher by 19.50% and 400% for low and high emission costs for the With
CE model compared to Without CE model. From this, we have a few things to note. First, the
retailer improves the profits on consideration of emissions into the objective irrespective of the cost
of emissions. Second, low emission costs are beneficial to the retailer as the profits are 30% higher
than the original profits. Third, the customers’ cost remains unaffected with the change of emission
costs, though the demand shift behavior is affected.
In the third instance, we change the cost of the inconvenience of the customers. The incon-
venience costs are included in the objective of customers. We observe that the inconvenience costs
do not impact the retailer’s profits much. However, the retailer has to use different TLOU prices at
low and high inconvenience costs. When the inconvenience cost is high, the retailer uses prices lower
than the competitor to maintain customers’ more economical costs. The retailer uses marginally
lower prices; for instance, when the competitor’s price is 20 cents, the retailer uses 17 cents. Thereby,
the customers’ demand shift behavior varies at low and high inconvenience costs. On average, the
customers shift 20% and 16% demand at low and high inconvenience costs, respectively. The %
reduction in customers’ total cost varies between 11.42% to 9.44% at low and high inconvenience
cost. Initially, the % reduction in customers’ cost is 10.80%. The retailer’s profits do not vary much,
and emission costs also remain the same. From this, we can say if the customers are more flexible
to shift demand, they achieve a higher % reduction in their total costs. Second, the retailer’s profits
remain unaffected i.e., and the retailer still makes higher profits on consideration of emissions.
From our several analyses, we conclude that consideration of emissions into TLOU pricing
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policy helps improve the retailer’s profits. The improvement in profits varies for different scenarios
such as fuel supply, emission costs, and remain unaffected with the change in inconvenience costs.
Further, by participating in the TLOU pricing structure, the customers can reduce their total costs.
The % cost saving for customers is more when they are more flexible to shift the demand to off-peak
hours.
5.3 Takeaway Messages
1. Retailer: Our framework helps the retailer to achieve higher profits on consideration of emis-
sion into the TLOU pricing policy and also lowers the emissions produced in electricity gen-
eration. When the emission costs are low, or restriction on fuel supply is not considered, the
retailer achieves higher profits. Further, in our analysis, we considered the cost of fuel to gen-
erate electricity. However, there are other costs involved, such as transmission, distribution,
or any other operational costs. According to [EIA-2020, ], the transmission and distribution
account for 12.50% and 27% of the total electricity pricing. Therefore, those costs can be
included in this framework to further assess the impacts of carbon emissions.
The retailer can use our models to set prices daily, monthly, quarterly, or at any frequency
adherent to the protocols. If the retailer wants to use this framework frequently, the retailer
may need to invest in fast computing hardware, as our models are computationally harder
to solve. The downside of changing prices daily is customers need to be informed daily, and
customers may also feel discomfort with daily change in prices. If the customers have smart
meters, then the retailer can program the changed prices beforehand.
2. Industrial Customers: Industrial customers have the potential to reduce the total electric-
ity cost by participating in our framework. The more flexible they are to shift demands from
on-peak hours to off-peak hours, the more they reduce their individual costs. Also, certain
industrial customers produce electricity in-house from sources such as solar power. The cus-
tomers should consider selling back the electricity into the framework if they have surplus
energy. This may further reduce their electricity costs.
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Appendix A Gurobi Log Output
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Gurobi output log
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